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I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing this Article in early fall 2005, the ink is barely
dry on the Supreme Court's decision in Brand X, in which the Court upheld
a 2002 ruling by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") that cable modem service is properly classified as an
information service and does not involve a separate offering of
telecommunications service.1 However, both houses of Congress and the
FCC have already reacted in the form of proposed legislation 2 and a Report
and Order,3 respectively, in an effort to expand the deregulatory approach
taken by the Commission in its Declaratory Ruling on cable modem
service, which the Supreme Court upheld.
5
This Article will examine the development of the FCC's distinction
between common carrier services regulated pursuant to Title H of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("Act"), and those regulated-if
at all-pursuant to the Commission's ancillary jurisdiction under Title I of
the Act.6 This Article will trace the evolution of this distinction from the
Computer Inquiry7 line of decisions through the Stevens Report,8 the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,9 Brand X,10 and the recent Wireline
Broadband Report and Order.11 This Article will conclude that the
1. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2706-
08 (2005).
2. See Ensign Bill, infra Part IV.C.
3. See Wireline Broadband Report and Order, infra Part IV.B.
4. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798
(2002) [hereinafter Declaratory Ruling].
5. BrandX, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2702.
6. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
7. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, para. 20
(1970) [hereinafter Computer I Tentative Decision], modified by Final Decision and Order,
28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971).
8. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R.
11501 (1998) [hereinafter Stevens Report].
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
10. BrandX, 125 S. Ct. 2688.
11. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
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Wireline Broadband Report and Order may be vulnerable to reversal on
appeal and will suggest some of the policy considerations that the
Commission may wish to consider if this order is remanded.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN REGULATED
AND UNREGULATED SERVICES
A. Basic Versus Enhanced Services: The Computer Inquiry Line of
Decisions
Nearly forty years ago, the FCC first faced the issue of whether and
how to regulate the provision of data processing services by common
carriers. The Commission recognized, even at that time, that applying
traditional economic regulation to data processing services might stifle the
growth of the then-nascent computer industry. 12 In fact, as early as 1970,
the FCC found in the Computer I proceeding that "the offering of data
processing services is essentially competitive and that, except to the limited
extent hereinafter set forth, there is no public interest requirement for
regulation... of such activities." 13 At the same time, the Commission also
recognized that, given the growing interdependence of telecommunications
and data processing, control by regulated common carriers over bottleneck
facilities could give such entities an opportunity to cross-subsidize their
services, thereby gaining an unfair advantage in the data processing
industry.
14
As a result of its concerns regarding cross-subsidy and unfair
competition, the FCC undertook in Computer I what would today-
notwithstanding the Commission's statement in the above paragraph-
hardly be considered "limited" regulation of data-processing activities by
common carriers. Under the rules adopted in Computer I, the FCC elected
to forbear from regulating data-processing services and to allow common
carriers 15 to provide such services through affiliates. 16 However, such
affiliates were subject to rigid structural separation requirements and were
Facilities; Universal Services Obligations of Broadband Providers, Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 05-150, http://ftp.fcc.gov/FCC-05-150AI.pdf
[hereinafter Wireline Broadband Report and Order].
12. E.g., Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 7, para. 23.
13. Id. para. 20.
14. Id. para. 25.
15. This true except for AT&T and its affiliates, which the FCC concluded were
prohibited by a consent judgment from entering into the data processing industry. Id. para.
24 (citing United States v. Western Electric Co., consent judgment, 13 RR 2143, 1956 Trade
Cas. 71, 134 (D.N.J. 1956)).
16. Id. paras. 36-37.
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strictly prohibited from providing services to affiliated common carriers,
even on an arm's-length basis.
The Commission distinguished regulated communications services
from unregulated data processing services by defining data processing as
"[t]he use of a computer for the processing of information as distinguished
from circuit or message-switching." 1 7 "Processing involves the use of the
computer for operations which include, inter alia, the functions of storing,
retrieving, sorting, merging and calculating data, according to programmed
instruction."'18 Anticipating that both common carriers and providers of
data processing services would provide hybrid services containing elements
of communications and data processing, the Commission adopted a test for
hybrid services that focused on the dominant characteristic of the overall
package offering. Where a package consisting primarily of data-processing
features contained communications elements that were "an integral part of
and as an incidental feature" of the data processing, then the Commission
determined that forbearance was appropriate with respect to the entire
service. 19 Conversely, the FCC found that hybrid services that were
"essentially communications" should be subject to Title II regulation. 20
By the late 1970s, technological advances in the computer industry
had significantly blurred the boundaries drawn in Computer I. In particular,
computing applications no longer resided exclusively on large mainframe
computers, but also ran on mini- and microcomputers that allowed the
decentralization of data processing operations. 2 1 In light of such
developments, the FCC undertook the Computer H proceeding to
reevaluate its regulatory framework governing the provision of computer
processing services via common carrier telecommunications facilities.
17. Id. para. 15(a).
18. Computer! Tentative Decision, supra note 7, para. 15(a).
19. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, para.
31(1971).
20. Id. para. 32.
21. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 1 (1980)
[hereinafter Computer 11 Final Decision] (observing that "dramatic advances" in technology
had "permitted fabrication of mini-computers, microcomputers, and other special purpose
devices" that were capable of duplicating many capabilities previously available only on
large, centralized computer systems), modified on recon., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) [hereinafter Computer 11 Reconsideration Order], further modified,
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981),
affd sub nom., Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
22. Computer H Final Decision, supra note 21, para 1.
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In Computer II, while the Commission retained the notion of
distinguishing between regulated, traditional common carrier services and
unregulated computer processing services, it developed what was, at the
time, a more workable distinction between the two. It defined "basic
service" as "the common carrier offering of transmission capacity for the
movement of information."' 23 On the other hand, "enhanced service
combine[d] basic service with computer processing applications that act on
the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's
transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored
information."'24 Put differently, the provision of the "pipe" by a common
carrier would be subject to Title II regulation while applications carried
over such pipe would not.
In Computer II, the FCC abolished the requirement that common
carriers form separate subsidiaries for the provision of enhanced services
except with respect to AT&T, which the Commission found to pose a
substantial threat to competition.25 The Commission also found that
AT&T's offering of enhanced services and customer premises equipment
through a structurally separate subsidiary would not violate the 1956
Western Electric consent decree. 26 In the Third Computer Inquiry, the FCC
replaced its structural separation requirements with nonstructural
safeguards, such as comparably efficient interconnection, open network
architecture, and nondiscrimination requirements.
27
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
Section 8(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act")
added several key definitions to Section 3 of the Communications Act of
1934. While the fundamental distinctions between enhanced services and
basic services remained, these terms were replaced with information
services and telecommunications services, respectively. These terms derive
from, and closely track, the definitions contained in the Modification of
23. Id. para. 5.
24. Id.
25. Id. para. 12. Note that in the Computer II Final Decision, the FCC applied the
structural separation requirements to both GTE and AT&T. However, the Commission
decided upon reconsideration that the costs of these requirements outweighed their benefits
with respect to GTE and retained structural separation requirements only for AT&T.
Computer 11 Reconsideration Order, supra note 21, para. 66.
26. Computer 1 Final Decision, supra note 21, para. 13.
27. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, paras. 3-6 (1986), vacated and
remanded, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), remanded to 118 P.U.R.4th 419 (1990).
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Final Judgment that governed the Bell. Operating Companies in the
aftermath of the breakup of the former AT&T monopoly.
28
First, the 1996 Act defined "information service" as the "offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not
include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or
operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a
telecommunications service. ' 29 The 1996 Act's legislative history shows
that Congress did not contemplate a radical change in the way in which the
Commission distinguishes between services that are subject to Title II
regulation and those that are not. To the contrary, the Conference
Committee stated that new subsection (pp) of the 1996 Act "defines
'information service' similar to the . . . Commission definition of
'enhanced services.' The Senate intends that the Commission would have
the continued flexibility to modify its definition and rules pertaining to
enhanced services as technology changes."
30
The 1996 Act defined "telecommunications service" as "the offering
of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of
users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the
facilities used."31  The 1996 Act in turn defined the term
"telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change
in the form or content of the information as sent and received." 32 The
28. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 335-38 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter
Modification of Final Judgment], affd sub nom., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
29. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000), with Modification of Final Judgment, which
defines "information service" as:
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information which may be
conveyed via telecommunications, except that such service does not include any
use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
Modification of Final Judgment, supra note 28, at 335.
30. JoINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP.
No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), www.vortex.com/privacy/tel-96.rpt [hereinafter JorNT
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT].
31. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000), with Modification of Final Judgment, at 337
(defining "telecommunications service" as "the offering for hire of telecommunications
facilities, or of telecommunications by means of such facilities.").
32. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000), with Modification of Final Judgment, which
defines "telecommunications" as:
the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of
the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received, by means of electromagnetic transmission . . . including all
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Conference Committee intended the definition of "telecommunications
service" to include "commercial mobile service ('CMS'), competitive
access services, and alternative local telecommunications services to the
extent that they are offered to the public or to such classes of users as to be
effectively available to the public. ' 33 Notably, the examples cited by the
Conference Committee are all services that either provide, or substitute for,
access to the public switched telephone network ("PSTN").
The Conference Committee also indicated that Congress intended the
definition of "telecommunications service" to include only "those services
and facilities offered on a 'common carrier' basis ......3 This statement,
together with the above list of examples of telecommunications services,
shows the following: (1) Congress intended telecommunications services to
be the equivalent of basic services under Computer H; and (2) Congress
envisioned that this term would describe only services provided by entities
already subject to Title II regulation or those that choose to act as a
common carrier.
III. INITIAL DIVERGENT TREATMENT OF BROADBAND INTERNET
ACCESS SERVICES
A. The Stevens Report
Over the years, communications services in the United States have
evolved from a luxury good to an essential service. During the course of
this evolution, the Commission developed policies and regulations
designed to assure that even the poorest citizens had access to
telecommunications services. The 1996 Act sought to replace the myriad,
implicit forms of universal service support that existed at the time with a
mechanism that would be explicit, competitively neutral, and able to
withstand the local competition that was envisioned in the 1996 Act. As
universal service contributions under the 1996 Act were to be payable only
with respect to telecommunications, in 1997 Congress required that the
FCC issue a report to Congress describing the effect of certain new
definitions contained in the 1996 Act on universal service support.35
instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (including the collection,
storage, forwarding, switching, and delivery of such information) essential to such
transmission.
Modification of Final Judgment, supra note 28, at 336-37.
33. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 623, 111 Stat. 2440, 2521-22 (1998).
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The FCC responded to its congressional mandate in 1998 with what is
popularly known as the Stevens Report.36 In addressing the definitional
issues, the Commission first found that Congress intended information
services and telecommunications services to be mutually exclusive terms.
The Commission disagreed with the position advanced by Senators Stevens
and Bums that the term "telecommunications carrier" includes "anyone
engaged in the transmission of 'information of the user's choosing."'
37
The text of the 1996 Act provided part of the basis for the
Commission's determination that information service and
telecommunications service are mutually exclusive categories. If a service
provider offers telecommunications (i.e., "transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without
change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received . ... ,38), the Commission reasoned that such a service must
necessarily exclude the provision of an information service, since an
information service by definition includes some "capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications, and [such term] includes
electronic publishing ... Further, the definition of information service
states that such a service is provided via telecommunications, suggesting
that telecommunications services are distinguishable from information
services.
The Commission also examined the legislative history and concluded
that the drafters of the House and Senate bills had viewed
telecommunications and information services as mutually exclusive.
40
Notably, earlier versions of the House bill and the Senate Report had
explicitly stated that the term telecommunications service excludes
information services.4 1 While Senators Stevens and Bums attached a great
deal of weight to the fact that this language had been deleted in later
versions of the respective documents, the Commission found that the
Senate Report omitted this language because of a manager's amendment
that was "intended to clarify that carriers of broadcast or cable services are
not intended to be classed as common carriers under the Communications
Act to the extent they provide broadcast services or cable services.
' 42
Numerous other senators supported the Commission's view that Congress
36. Stevens Report, supra note 8.
37. Id. para. 35. (citation omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id. para. 30.
40. Stevens Report, supra note 8, para. 44.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citations omitted).
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had intended telecommunications services and information services to be
mutually exclusive.4 3 Finally, the Commission observed, in what was
perhaps the strongest justification for its interpretation, that the Computer II
framework had been in place for sixteen years at the time the 1996 Act was
adopted and that the interpretation advanced by Senators Stevens and
Burns would result in a greatly increased level of regulation on services
theretofore unregulated." In light of the procompetitive, deregulatory goals
espoused by the 1996 Act, such a reading of Congress's intent would be at
best a strained interpretation, and at worst, completely at odds with the
1996 Act's purpose.
B. The Advanced Services Memorandum Opinion and Order
In 1998, the Commission issued the Advanced Services Memorandum
Opinion and Order in response to six petitions proposing actions the
Commission could take to speed the deployment by wireline carriers of
advanced services such as digital subscriber line ("DSL")-based Internet
access.4 5 The Commission noted the goals of Congress with respect to the
1996 Act, such as encouraging innovation and investment and opening
markets to competition. It indicated that it was adopting the Advanced
Services Memorandum Opinion and Order in furtherance of these goals.
46
Before the Commission could address the issue of what statutory
obligations would apply to the provision of "advanced services," which the
Commission defined as "wireline, broadband telecommunications services,
such as services that rely on digital subscriber line technology . . . and
packet-switched technology," the Commission first had to address the
proper regulatory classification of advanced services. 47 The Commission
observed that its application of the 1996 Act's definitions would determine
the statutory obligations to which advanced services would be subject.48
The Commission concluded that "advanced services are
telecommunications services," noting that it had repeatedly found specific
packet-based services to be basic services (i.e., pure transmission
43. Id. paras. 37-38.
44. Id. paras. 45-46.
45. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
F.C.C.R. 24011 (1998) [hereinafter Advanced Services Memorandum Opinion and Order].
The following entities filed the petitions that led to the adoption of the Advanced Services
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Bell Atlantic Corp.; U S WEST Comm., Inc.; Ameritech
Corp.; Alliance for Public Tech.; Ass'n for Local Telecomm. Serv. ("ALTS"); and,
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Pacific Bell, and Nevada Bell (filing jointly). Id.
46. Id. paras. 1-2.
47. Id. para. 3 (citations omitted).
48. Id. para. 35.
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services).49 In support of its conclusion, the Commission observed that
DSL and packet switching are "simply transmission technologies" and
briefly summarized its treatment of transmission services as basic services
under the Computer Inquiry line of decisions. 50 The Commission further
explained that it had previously found the 1996 Act's definitions of
telecommunications services and information services to be equivalent to
the Computer II definitions of basic services and enhanced services,
respectively.
51
The Commission found that "[a]n end-user may utilize a
telecommunications service together with an information service, as in the
case of Internet access. ' 52 However, the Commission also determined that
it would treat these services separately (i.e., the DSL-enabled transmission
path would be regulated as a telecommunications service, and the Internet
access would be an information service). 53 The Commission explicitly
acknowledged its determination in the Stevens Report that the terms
telecommunications service and information service are mutually
exclusive, 54 strongly suggesting that the Commission saw no conflict
between this finding and the notion that a service package including both
transmission and Internet access could be viewed as containing two
separate and distinct services.
The Commission's decision in the Advanced Services Memorandum
Opinion and Order to classify DSL as a telecommunications service
closely followed the reasoning of its Computer Inquiry decisions and did
not generate substantial controversy at the time. For example, neither the
petitioners nor any of the commenters challenged the Commission's
finding that DSL service was properly classified as a telecommunications
service.5 5 Moreover, none of the Commissioners who took part in the
decision questioned this finding.
56
In its four subsequent orders in the Advanced Services proceeding, the
Commission did not question its decision to classify DSL service as a
49. Id.
50. Advanced Services Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 45, para. 35.
51. Id. para. 35 n.56.
52. Id. para. 36.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. para. 34 n.50.
55. Id. para. 36 (citation omitted).
56. See id. at 24117-22 (concurring statements of Comm'rs Ness, Tristani, and Powell);
see also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Order on Remand, 15 F.C.C.R. 385 (1999) (Comm'r Harold Furchtgott-Roth,
approving in part & dissenting in part) (disagreeing with classification of advanced service
as "telephone exchange service," but not questioning the decision to classify such service as
a "telecommunications service") [hereinafter Advanced Services Remand Order].
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telecommunications service.5 7 To the contrary, in the Advanced Services
Remand Order, the Commission expressly affirmed its 5rior conclusion
that DSL services constitute telecommunications services.
C. The Declaratory Ruling on Cable Modem Service
Section 706 of the 1996 Act directed the Commission to initiate a
notice of inquiry within 30 months of the enactment of the 1996 Act, and
regularly thereafter, concerning the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capabilities in the United States.59 In response to its
statutory mandate, the Commission released its First Section 706 Inquiry in
1998 and raised the issue of what regulatory treatment should apply to
cable modem service.60 While the issue arose several times from 1999 to
2000, the Commission did not adopt a regulatory classification for cable
modem service that would apply on an industry-wide basis.6 1 In 2000,
following its Second Section 706 Inquiry,62 the Commission decided that it
must address the appropriate classification of cable modem service and
released a Notice of Inquiry the same year that sought information
concerning this service. Two years after issuing the Notice of Inquiry
regarding cable modem service, the Commission released its Declaratory
Ruling for the purpose of resolving the status of this service under the Act
and determining how to regulate cable modem service, if at all.64 The
Commission stated that three principles guided it in reaching its
conclusions: (1) "encourag[ing] the ubiquitous availability of broadband to
57. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14
F.C.C.R. 4761 (1999); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, Second Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 19237 (1999);
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability,
Third Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (1999); Advanced Services Remand Order,
supra note 56.
58. Advanced Services Remand Order, supra note 56, at 388.
59. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706(b), 110 Stat. 56, 153
(1996).
60. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Adv. Telecomm. Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of
Inquiry, 13 F.C.C.R. 15280, paras. 4-8 (1998).
61. See Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 2.
62. See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913 (2000).
63. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other
Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19287, para. 1 (2000).
64. See Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 1.
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all Americans"; (2) allowing "broadband services [to] exist in a minimal
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a
competitive market"; and (3) "seek[ing] to create a rational framework for
the regulation of competing services that are provided via different
technologies and network architectures."
65
The Commission devoted a great deal of attention in the Declaratory
Ruling to the commercial arrangements between and among cable system
operators and Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), noting that some cable
operators have historically chosen to make capacity available to
unaffiliated ISPs while others have not.66 The Commission also described
the various functions that cable operators often include in their service
offerings, such as "protocol conversion, IP address number assignment,
domain name resolution through a domain name system ("DNS"), network
security, and caching." 67 After applying the relevant statutory definitions to
its understanding of the commercial arrangements for and technical
elements of cable modem service, the FCC determined that "cable modem
service as currently provided is an interstate information service, not a
cable service, and that there is no separate telecommunications service
offering to subscribers or ISPs."
' 68
The Commission's finding that Internet access provided to end-user
consumers via cable modem service constitutes an information service did
not engender much controversy. Such services clearly consist of more than
the "transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content• • • ,,69
of the information as sent and received. Rather, the DNS services,
protocol conversion, and other elements of cable modem service offer a
"capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing,
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information."
70
However, the Commission's determination that cable modem service
does not involve a separate offering of telecommunications service was,
and is, controversial. With respect to the cable modem service offered to
end-user customers, the Commission found that the transmission
capacity-the portion of cable modem service that can be considered
65. Id. paras. 4-6.
66. See generally id. paras. 15-30 (showing that cable operators such as AOL Time
Warner, Comcast, and AT&T had followed a multiple-ISP approach despite greater
technical complexities in doing so, while Cox, Charter, and Cablevision each followed a
business model involving the use of only one ISP).
67. Id. para. 17.
68. Id. para. 33.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
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telecommunications-is not separately offered and that this pipe therefore
does not meet the statutory definition of telecommunications service.71 As
for the offering of pure transmission capacity on a wholesale basis to
unaffiliated ISPs, the Commission noted that the cable operators making
such capacity available had decided to deal with particular ISPs on an
individual basis and therefore had determined on a case-by-case basis the
terms on which they would deal with such ISPs.72 In light of the FCC's
interpretation of telecommunications service as equivalent to a common
carrier service-which had been upheld by the U. S. Court of Appeals for
the D. C. Circuit-the Commission found that, to the extent cable operators
were making transmission capacity available to unaffiliated ISPs, they were
not offering it to the public, but rather were doing so on a private carrier
basis.
73
The Commission's conclusion regarding the regulatory classification
of cable modem service as provided to subscribers was more consistent
with both Computer H and the 1996 Act. For example, an enhanced service
under Com4uter H necessarily combined a basic service with computer
processing. Moreover, the Commission noted that under the 1996 Act, an
information service is by definition provided via telecommunications.
75
The decision to classify cable modem service as an information service
finds further support in the Commission's previous finding that information
services and telecommunications services are mutually exclusive
categories, as well as the fact that the Commission had never applied Title
II regulation to cable operators.
Alternatively, the Commission's finding that the offering of
transmission capacity to unaffiliated ISPs is not a telecommunications
service is somewhat more difficult to justify. In many respects, such a
service closely resembles the offering of capacity on the network of a
wireline carrier. Moreover, there is clearly a tautological element in the
Commission's reasoning. The Commission found that cable modem service
was not properly classified as a telecommunications service largely due to
the fact that the service was not provided on a common carrier basis.76 In
71. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, paras. 39-40.
72. Id. para. 55.
73. Id.; see also Virgin Islands Tel. Co. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
74. See supra Part II.A. One distinction between services provided under the Computer
11 rules and cable modem service, which is not trivial, is that the enhanced service provider
would not normally be a facilities-based carrier, but would instead lease capacity from
AT&T for the purpose of selling value-added services. See Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2716-17
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 39 (citations omitted).
76. See BrandX, 125 S.Ct. at 2714-18, n.7 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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so doing, the Commission reacted more to the business decisions the cable
companies had already made and relationships those companies had
already formed, than it focused on whether or not policy considerations
warranted imposing Title II regulation on cable operators.
Notwithstanding the above weakness underlying the Commission's
reasoning in the Declaratory Ruling, there are at least two reasons why the
Commission was correct in its result. First, Title II regulation was intended
from the beginning to govern traditional, monopolistic, wireline telephone
companies. Despite the fact that cable modem service was becoming
available on a commercial basis by late 1996,77 nothing in the 1996 Act
suggests that Congress intended to apply common carrier regulation to
cable operators. Second, and more importantly, legal precedent enshrines the
principle that a service provider is only a common carrier if it either chooses
to hold itself out to the public as such or if it is under a legal obligation to
do so. 7 8 Consequently, since the Commission determined that cable
operators had not held themselves out to the public as common carriers and
also found no legal obligation for cable operators to act as common
carriers, it acted consistently with NARUC I in reaching its conclusion that
transmission capacity for cable modem service is not a telecommunications
service because it is not provided on a common carrier basis.
79
IV. BRAND X AND IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
A. The Decisions
1. Court of Appeals Decision
Brand X Internet Services and other ISPs appealed the Declaratory
Ruling, arguing that cable modem service comprises both a
telecommunications service component and an information service
component. 80 A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the appellants, finding that the Court's prior interpretation of
the 1996 Act controlled its review of the Declaratory Ruling.
8 1
77. See Cable Digital News, Cable Modem Info Center,
http://www.cabledigitalnews.com/cmic/cmic l.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
78. See National Ass'n of Reg. Utils. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir.),
superceded by statute as recognized by 78 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
79. See Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 55 (explaining the historic distinction
between common carriage and private carriage, and finding that AOL Time Warner was
"determining on an individual basis whether to deal with any particular ISP and [was] in
each case deciding the terms on which it [would] deal with any particular ISP.").
80. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 1132.
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The court of appeals had previously addressed the issue of how to
classify cable modem service in AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, which it
decided in 2000 in the absence of any definitive FCC pronouncements on
the subject.82 The Portland decision addressed the issue of whether local
cable franchising boards could require AT&T to provide open access to its
broadband facilities as a condition of local approval of the AT&T and TCI
merger. The local authorities had premised their actions on the position that
cable modem service is a cable service.83 The court of appeals noted that a
cable service under the 1996 Act is a one-way transmission of
programming to subscribers generally and found that cable modem service
did not fit this description; therefore, local authorities could not directly
regulate cable modem service through their franchising authority. 84 The
court went on to find that the pipeline provided by the cable modem
operators was a telecommunications service and that the Internet access
was an information service.85 Because Section 541(b)(3)(B) of the 1996
Act provides that a franchising authority may not impose any requirement
that has the effect of limiting the provision of telecommunications by a
cable operator, the court concluded that the local franchise authorities were
prohibited from conditioning the franchise transfer on AT&T's provision of
open access to its broadband network. In its decision, the court of appeals
first described the Portland decision in detail and stated that its
determination of the proper regulatory classification of cable modem
service had been necessary to that decision, so the classification has
precedential value. 87 In considering whether the Declaratory Ruling had
any effect on the validity of its holding in Portland, the court noted that
only an en banc panel would have the authority to issue a decision that
overruled the precedent set in Portland.
88
The court of appeals relied on its 1988 decision Mesa Verde
Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of Laborers in
addressing the proper weight to give to the FCC's decision. 89 In Mesa
Verde, the court had held that "if a panel finds that an [agency]
interpretation of [its statute] is reasonable and consistent with [the law], the
panel may adopt that interpretation even if circuit precedent is to the
82. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
83. Id. at 875.
84. Id. at 876-77.
85. Id. at 878.
86. See id. at 878-79.
87. Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1130.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of
Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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contrary." However, the Court had also qualified the holding in Mesa
Verde by stating that an earlier panel decision could only be disregarded
"where the precedent constituted deferential review of [agency]
decisionmaking." 91 The court in Portland was not faced with an agency's
construction of a statute that could require deference under the Chevron
doctrine.9 2 Rather, the court had to interpret what the court considered the
plain language of the statute. The Brand X court found that Mesa Verde did
not apply and that the court was therefore bound to follow Portland.
93
Accordingly, the court of appeals vacated the FCC's determination that
cable modem service was not a telecommunications service.
2. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court released its eagerly anticipated Brand X decision
in late June 2005. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's application of the Chevron doctrine.
94
The Court overturned the court of appeals decision, holding that the
Declaratory Ruling was a lawful construction of the 1996 Act under
Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act.
95
The Court first examined the question of whether it should apply the
Chevron doctrine to its review of the Declaratory Ruling. While the court
of appeals had found that its interpretation of the 1996 Act in AT&T Corp.
v. City of Portland trumped the FCC's later interpretation in the
Declaratory Ruling, the Court noted that nothing in Portland indicated that
the court of appeals had found the statute unambiguous. 96 Observing that
"Chevron's premise is that it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory
gaps," the Court found that the court of appeals had erred in finding that
Portland foreclosed the FCC from interpreting an ambiguous statute and
that the court of appeals should instead have applied a deferential Chevron
analysis to the Declaratory Ruling.
97
Having determined that the Chevron framework applied to its review
of the Declaratory Ruling, the Court then turned to the two-step procedure
established by Chevron. The first part of the Chevron test is whether
Congress has "directly addres[sed] the precise question at issue." 98 In
90. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136.
91. Id.
92. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93. BrandX, 345 F.3dat 1131.
94. Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2699-2702.
95. Id. at 2695.
96. Id. at 2701-02.
97. Id. at 2700-01.
98. Id. at 2702 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
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applying this part of the Chevron analysis to the Declaratory Ruling, the
Court found that "[t]he term 'offer' as used in the definition of
telecommunications service... is ambiguous" because this definition does
not clearly indicate whether a company that offers an integrated broadband
Internet service is thereby offering a telecommunications service or is
merely using telecommunications. The Court looked to the language of
the 1996 Act and the ordinary usage of the word "offer" in reaching this
conclusion. 00  Further, the Court found that "[tihe Commission's
traditional distinction between basic and enhanced service also supports the
conclusion that the Communications Act is ambiguous about whether cable
companies 'offer' telecommunications with cable modem service" and
noted that expanding Title II regulation to cover cable operators would
have effected a major shift in Commission policy. 101
In the second step of the Chevron analysis, a court defers to the
agency's interpretation if that construction is "a reasonable policy choice
for the agency to make." 1° 2 The Court found that the Commission had
acted reasonably and rejected the two central arguments made by the
respondents. First, the Court found that the Commission's interpretation of
the 1996 Act would not allow communications providers to evade common
carrier regulation simply by bundling a telecommunications service with an
information service, despite the respondents' arguments to the contrary.1
03
The Court also concluded that the Commission had acted reasonably in
finding that cable modem service is more than a transparent transmission
path from an end-user perspective, and the Court noted the various
functions provided by cable operators through a cable modem service,
particularly DNS service.
104
Finally, after completing the above Chevron analysis, the Court
addressed the issue of whether the Commission's decision to classify cable
modem service differently from DSL service was "arbitrary and
99. Brand X, 125 S.Ct. at 2704 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia strongly disagreed
with the majority's reasoning on this point and in a well-reasoned dissent argued that
[t]he relevant question is whether the individual components in a package being
offered still possess sufficient identity to be described as separate objects of the
offer, or whether they have been so changed by their combination with the other
components that it is no longer reasonable to describe them in that way.
Id. at 2714 (Scalia, J. dissenting). However, while Justice Scalia's argument is persuasive,
the fact that nine Supreme Court justices could not agree on the proper interpretation of the
1996 Act in itself supports the notion that the statute is ambiguous.
100. Id. at 2704-05.
101. Id. at 2706-07 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 2702 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).
103. Id. at 2708.
104. Id. at 2709-10.
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capricious" as respondent MCI had argued. 10 5 The Court stated that "the
Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change
course if it adequately justifies the change."' 106 Finding that the
Commission had chosen to classify DSL service as a telecommunications
service rather than an information service "based on... history, rather than
on an analysis of contemporaneous market conditions," 107 the Court found
"nothing arbitrary about the Commission's providing a fresh analysis" with
respect to the cable industry. ° 8 However, the Court cautioned that it was
expressing "no view on how the Commission should, or lawfully may,
classify DSL service."
109
B. The Wireline Broadband Report and Order
After the Supreme Court released the Brand X decision, the
Commission immediately turned its attention to the issue of whether DSL
service, the primary broadband alternative to cable modem service, also
should be classified as an information service. The FCC had tentatively
concluded in 2002 that DSL service should be so classified, but had not
acted on its Notice of Proposed RulemakingI10 in that proceeding pending
resolution of the legal challenges to the Declaratory Ruling.II In August
2005, the Commission released the Wireline Broadband Report and Order,
in which it adopted its previous, tentative conclusion that DSL service is
appropriately classified as an information service. 12
The Commission had little difficulty finding that DSL is an
"information service."11 3 Specifically, the Commission found that DSL
service involves "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring,
storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications . . . ." The Commission had made
the same finding in the Declaratory Ruling115 with respect to cable modem
service, a conclusion that was not challenged in Brand X. As the
105. BrandX, 125 S.Ct. at 2710.
106. Id.
107. ld. at 2711.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002).
111. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4.
112. Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11.
113. See id. paras. 12-17.
114. Id. para. 13.
115. See supra Part HIL.C; see also Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, at 4821-22; Brand
X, 125 S.Ct. at 2711 (noting that the Commission's finding that cable modem service is an
"information service" was not challenged).
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characteristics of cable modem service that resulted in its classification as
an information service are virtually indistinguishable from the
characteristics of DSL service from a functional, end-user perspective, it is
unlikely that this portion of the Wireline Broadband Report and Order will
cause much controversy.
However, the key conclusion of the Wireline Broadband Report and
Order is as controversial, or more so, than the Declaratory Ruling. Relying
primarily on changed marketplace conditions, most notably the advent of
intermodal competition, the Commission held that wireline carriers will no
longer be required to "separate out the underlying transmission from
wireline broadband Internet access service and offer it on a common carrier
basis."'1 16 Rather, the Commission concluded that carriers should be able to
choose when to offer broadband transmission capacity and have a one-year
transition period to decide whether to offer such capacity on a private
carrier basis (i.e., not subject to Title II regulation) or as a common
carrier.1 17 Only in the latter case-where a carrier makes an affirmative
choice to offer capacity on a common carrier basis-would the carrier be
deemed to be offering telecommunications services.
118
Interestingly, in reaching the decision that DSL transmission service
would only be a telecommunications service to the extent carriers choose to
offer it as such, the Commission failed to acknowledge the opposite
conclusion it had reached in the Advanced Services Order and limited its
discussion of that order to a single mention in a footnote. 119 One could
easily conclude in reading the Wireline Broadband Report and Order that
the Commission had never made an affirmative determination that DSL
Internet access service is a telecommunications service and that Brand X
and the Declaratory Ruling were the only recent, relevant precedent. The
question of whether DSL service includes a separate offering of a
telecommunications service is a more complex issue than whether cable
modem service includes such an offering and requires a slightly different
analysis. Notably, unlike cable operators, it is likely that providers of
facilities-based DSL service have "made a stand-alone offering of
transmission for a fee.., to such classes of users as to be effectively
116. Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 42.
117. Id. paras. 86-89.
118. See id. para. 90.
119. See Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 12 n.32 (stating
that the Commission had "not been entirely consistent" with respect to the question of
whether the "categories of 'information service' and 'telecommunications service' are
mutually exclusive" without noting that in the Advanced Services Memorandum Opinion
and Order, the Commission had in fact found these categories to be mutually exclusive but
had also determined that DSL Internet access service consists of two separate services, an
information service and a telecommunications service).
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available directly to the public." 120 Further, the wireline carriers that offer
DSL service also offer traditional voice service (i.e., telecommunications
services) directly to the public using the same lines.12 1 The Supreme Court
summarized the rationale underlying the Declaratory Ruling as follows:
"[sleen from the consumer's point of view, the Commission concluded,
cable modem service is not a telecommunications offering because the
consumer uses the high-speed wire always in connection with the
information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access, and
because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access[.]" 122
Significantly, a DSL customer uses the same wire not only for DSL
service, but also for voice service.
123
In the Wireline Broadband Report and Order, the Commission did
not fully address these distinctions and omitted any indication that in the
Declaratory Ruling it had deemed the fact significant that cable modem
service does not include an offering of telecommunications to ISPs.
124
While the Commission did not expressly indicate that it was giving
decisional significance to this fact, one of the primary reasons the
Commission gave for its decision in the Declaratory Ruling was that cable
operators had not made stand-alone offerings of transmission for a fee,
either to end users or to "such classes of users as to be effectively available
directly to the public." 125 The latter statement strongly suggested that the
offering of capacity to ISPs on a common carrier basis would have entailed
a different result (i.e., that cable modem service does include a separate
offering of telecommunications service).
Given the high stakes surrounding the struggle for access by ISPs and
competitive local exchange carriers ("LECs") to incumbent LECs'
120. See Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 40 (stating that the Commission is not
aware of any cable modem service provider that has charged a transmission fee).
121. See, e.g., Verizon Web site, Frequently Asked Questions - DSL, at Technology 1-
5, http://www22.verizon.com/forhomedsllchannels/dslllearnmorefaqs/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2006).
122. BrandX, 125 S.Ct. at 2703 (citing Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 39). The
accuracy of this statement is debatable at best: a consumer uses the same "high-speed wire"
for cable service as for cable modem service. In fact, a cable customer who elects not to
purchase cable modem service at all, but whose cable system has been upgraded to allow the
offering of such service, would never use this high-speed wire in connection with the
information-processing capabilities provided by Internet access service.
123. Admittedly, one could argue that the "high-speed wire" in the DSL context includes
only the high-frequency portion of the loop. However, as noted, the consumer uses the same
physical wire for both DSL and traditional voice services. Further, consumers whose local
loops have been conditioned to allow the provision of DSL, but choose not to subscribe to
this service, use the line only for the transmission of telecommunications services.
124. Declaratory Ruling, supra note 4, para. 48.
125. See id. para. 40.
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broadband facilities, it is all but certain that the Wireline Broadband Report
and Order will be challenged in court. The Commission, apparently
contemplating such a possibility, stated that it "is free to modify its own
rules at any time to take into account changed circumstances."12 6 However,
a court may set aside such an action upon a finding that the agency acted in
a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."127 When an agency changes an
existing policy, it must "supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond
that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
instance.' 128 The parties that appeal the Wireline Broadband Report and
Order will likely argue that the Commission failed to engage in reasoned
decision making because it failed even to mention its previous
classification of DSL services, much less provide evidence of the changes
since 1999 that necessitated a change in course. Such arguments are not
without merit.
The Commission chose not to exercise its forbearance authority under
Section 10 of the 1996 Act, expressing confidence in its decision to
reclassify DSL services. 19 Had the Commission elected to do so, it could
have forborne from exercising Title H regulation on DSL services upon a
finding that:
(1) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to
ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for,
or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or
telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not
unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;
(2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
protection of consumers; and
(3) forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is
consistent with the public interest. 130
Given the Commission's previous decision in the Advanced Services
Memorandum Opinion and Order, together with its apparent reluctance to
acknowledge, much less explain, its change of course, a decision to forbear
from exercising Title II regulation on DSL services arguably could have
126. Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11, para. 81 (citing Brand X,125
S.Ct. at 2699).
127. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
128. Id. at 42.
129. Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11, paras. 81-82; see also 47
U.S.C. § 160 (2000). Note that the Commission did elect to forbear from imposing tariff
requirements on those carriers that choose to offer DSL-based transmission capacity on a
common carrier basis. Wireline Broadband Report and Order, supra note 11, paras. 91-94.
130. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a)(1)-(3) (2000).
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been a safer approach in some respects. If the Wireline Broadband Report
and Order is reversed on appeal, the Commission may wish to consider
developing a record concerning the extent to which intermodal competition
exists, particularly with respect to emerging technologies. Significantly, if
the Commission determines that robust intermodal competition exists in the
market for broadband services, it arguably could find that incumbent LECs
are not required to offer identical prices for DSL transmission capacity to
unaffiliated competitive LECs or ISPs. Notably, nothing in the Act
prohibits price discrimination by common carriers, only "unjust or
unreasonable" discrimination. 131 Since the FCC's primary goal is to protect
consumers, not competitors, one could argue that price discrimination is
not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory if such practices have no
adverse impact on consumers due to the availability of competing forms of
broadband Internet access. Other issues to consider in a forbearance
analysis would include the extent to which incumbent LECs can be shown
to have deferred investment due to regulatory considerations and economic
analyses of requirements, such as interconnection and universal service
contribution on the respective market shares of DSL service providers and
cable modem service providers.
Whichever course of action the Commission takes regarding DSL,
and regardless of whether or not the Wireline Broadband Report and Order
is affirmed on appeal, the FCC will need to be mindful of the possibility
that, as more and more services migrate to an Internet protocol-based
platform, certain services it currently regulates as telecommunications
services, particularly voice services, will likely one day be reduced to mere
applications provided as part of a DSL package. As the Commission has
already determined that the information service and telecommunications
service elements of DSL are inseparable, it will be hard-pressed to develop
a reasoned explanation of why an application riding on the network can be
separated and regulated. Such convergence would undoubtedly strain the
already burdened universal service mechanism past its breaking point and
will also raise important issues in other areas of regulation, such as
disability access.
C. The Ensign Bill
On July 27, 2005, exactly one month after the Supreme Court decided
Brand X, Senator John Ensign of Nevada introduced a bill "[t]o establish a
market driven telecommunications marketplace, to eliminate government
managed competition of existing communication service, and to provide
131. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000).
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parity between functionally equivalent services." 132 While published
reports suggest that the bill is not likely to pass, 133 its proposed elimination
of the distinction between Title I and Title 1I services may foreshadow the
direction of future legislation.
In the Ensign Bill, Basic Telephone Service ("BTS") would retain a
distinct regulatory classification. BTS would include single-line, flat-rate
voice services within a local calling area, with access to 911, with touch-
tone dialing, and with access to long distance. 134 The definition of BTS
would exclude interexchange wireline service.
135
The Ensign Bill would create a new category of service, a
"communications service," defined as:
any service enabling an end user to transmit, receive, store, forward,
retrieve, modify, or obtain, voice, data, image, or video
communications using any technology, including-(i) copper; (ii)
coaxial cable; (iii) optical fiber; (iv) terrestrial fixed wireless; (v)
terrestrial mobile wireless; (vi) satellite; (vii) power lines; or (viii)
successor technologies; and.., does not include (i) television or radio
broadcasting; and (ii) any service that is not provided to the public or
to a substantial portion of the public. 136
The bill defines "broadband communications service" as a communications
service with a capacity of greater than 64 kilobits per second.
137
The new term "communications service" would essentially collapse
the categories of "telecommunications service" and "information service"
into a single category. Such services would be subject only to regulation in
areas such as consumer protection, E9 11, consumer proprietary network
information, access for persons with disabilities. 138 Notably, this would
result in some additional regulation on services such as voice over Internet
protocol even as the regulatory burden is reduced for traditional, circuit-
switched voice services. This would help reduce the opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage under the current regulatory scheme as noted above in
Part IV.B.
132. S. 1504, 109th Cong. Preamble (2005) [hereinafter Ensign Bill].
133. COMM. DAILY, Aug. 30, 2005, at 9.
134. Ensign Bill, supra note 132, § 4(a)(1).
135. Id.
136. Id. § 4(a)(4).
137. Id. §4(a)(2). Other parties will undoubtedly comment upon the curious definition of
broadband as anything above 64 kbps in what is otherwise a forward-thinking piece of
legislation.
138. Id. § 8(a).
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V. CONCLUSION
As described in this Article, radical changes in communications
technologies and the competitive environment over the past forty years
have forced the Commission to rethink the manner in which it distinguishes
between traditional, common carrier transmission services and newer
applications that make use of such services. The Declaratory Ruling
marked a conscious decision to refrain from imposing legacy economic
regulation on new services that bore considerable resemblances to those
services provided by the former monopoly carriers. Following the Supreme
Court's affirmance of the Declaratory Ruling in Brand X, the Commission
made a well-intentioned, but perhaps legally flawed, effort to level the
playing field for similar services provided over different platforms. While
some defenders of the Wireline Broadband Report and Order contend that
this order promotes greater certainty for incumbent LECs, the great irony is
that these carriers will likely face more uncertainty over the coming
months, or years, in which the inevitable litigation surrounding this order
runs its course. Looking forward, it is essential that the FCC and Congress
both act in a manner that is even-handed and promotes competition, but
also creates certainty for service providers while protecting consumers and
advancing important social goals such as continued affordability of basic
telephone service.
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